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Abstract
Elections play a crucial role in post-conflict peace 
and democratization processes as, among other fac-
tors, they provide an answer to the question of who is 
to legitimately rule the country. However, because of 
the competitiveness arising from their central role in 
allocating power they can also represent windows of 
vulnerability where deeply rooted societal conflicts can 
come to the surface.  This working paper focuses on 
two post-conflict elections (Sierra Leone 2007; Nepal 
2008) which, despite perceived high risks, did not result 
in widespread violence or a return to armed conflict. 
 The aim of these case studies is to identify the 
factors and measures that may have played an impor-
tant role in contributing to this outcome. Each of the 
two case studies first outlines the risks associated 
with the elections and then analyzes the violence and 
conflict preventing factors. The paper shows that that 
the context greatly influences the type of measures 
that can be taken in such situations, but that there 
are also some similarities in the two cases studied. 
In particular, it appears that that the credibility of the 
elections, largely attributable to a good electoral ad-
ministration, was an important factor in both Nepal 
and Sierra Leone. Furthermore, the inclusion of all key 
stakeholders in decisions regarding key electoral ins-
titutions helped to diffuse potential conflict. The study 
also shows that in both cases the international com-
munity played an important role by providing financi-
al, logistical and technical support and by pressuring 
certain important actors to comply with the rules. 
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Introduction1
Elections play a crucial role in post-conflict peace processes. They provide 
one answer to the fundamental question – often a major cause of internal 
armed conflict – of who is to legitimately rule the country. Successful 
electoral processes are a “critical means of social conflict management 
through peaceful deliberations and decision-making processes in which 
'winners' carry out promised policy initiatives and programs and 'losers' are 
given the opportunity to serve as a loyal opposition, and to try again in future 
competition.” (UNDP 2009, 1)  Nevertheless, because of their role in allocating 
power, elections can also represent a catalyst for violent conflict. While root 
causes of political conflict often precede the electoral process, failed 
elections can be the spark that leads to political violence.   
 Policy makers aiming at supporting the establishment of peaceful, 
democratic states are thus confronted with the question of how to reduce the 
risk of election-related violence and conflict. Research on this question has so 
far mostly been directed at understanding and analyzing the causes, actors, 
and dynamics of these destructive phenomena. However, despite a recent 
surge in literature, little consensus exists as of now regarding the factors 
fuelling violence in the context of elections2. The aim of this paper is to 
contribute to a growing literature on the possible measures that can be taken 
by policy makers to prevent or mitigate the effects of electoral violence and 
conflict3 by carving out the lessons learned from two elections that took place 
in a post-conflict context: the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections 
in Sierra Leone and the 2008 constituent assembly elections in Nepal. More 
specifically, the goal of this research is to suggest hypotheses regarding the 
factors that may have contributed to the peaceful conduct of the elections 
and to put forward measures that appeared to be effective in these particular 
cases. 
 
 Both these elections proved the skeptics and pessimists wrong. The 
presidential and parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone took place in a 
relatively peaceful atmosphere despite widespread fears to the contrary. The 
Constituent Assembly elections in Nepal, while overshadowed by violence 
during the campaign phase, did not result in a disruption of the peace process 
but rather strengthened it.  Both the Sierra Leone and the Nepal elections led 
to a significant shift in power, with opposition parties gaining most votes, 
which can be interpreted as an indicator of their integrity (see Collier and 
Vicente forthcoming)4. While the Nepal and Sierra Leone elections share these 
common features, they also differ in many respects. In addition to the obvious 
important differences between the two countries due to their different 
regional context, important factors linked to the electoral process itself 
differed from one case to the other. In particular, the timing of the election 
relative to the preceding armed conflict, the type of election (parliamentary 
and presidential in Sierra Leone versus constituent assembly in Nepal), the 
electoral system, the stakes of the election and the main challenges in their 
organization were different in each of these elections. Because of these 
specific characteristics of the two cases, it is particularly interesting to study 
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1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the 
support of the Human Security Divi-
sion of the Swiss Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs. They also wish to thank 
Sarah Bernasconi, Tatiana Monney and 
Damiano Sguaitamatti for their comments 
on earlier versions of this study. The 
views expressed in this report are those 
of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect those of swisspeace or the Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs. 
2 For some primary attempts to identify 
and classify the risks of election related 
violence see Fischer (2001), UNDP (2009) 
Höglund (2009) Alston (2010).
3 See notably UNDP (2009); Frazer and 
Gyimah-Boadi (2011), Global Commis-
sion on Elections Democracy & Security 
(2012); Kammerud (2012).
4 The argument is that incumbents can 
more easily resort to bribery and ballot 
fraud to win the election. Hence, a shift 
in power suggests that these tactics were 
little used or did not prove effective.
7them simultaneously, which enables us to compare the factors identified 
across cases and to formulate lessons learned in more general terms. 
From that perspective, our analysis shows that the context greatly influences 
the type of measures that can be taken to prevent election-related violence, 
but that there are also some similarities between the two cases studied. In 
particular, it appears that that the inclusion of all stakeholders in decisions 
regarding key institutional arrangements for the conduct of the election was 
an important factor in both Nepal and Sierra Leone. The study also shows that 
in both cases, the electoral process was perceived overall as credible, notably 
because the standard procedures and recommendations were generally 
followed. In that respect, the international community has played an 
important role by providing financial and logistical assistance as well as by 
being involved in the training of election and security officials. Additionally, 
the international community has also played a role showing its commitment 
for fair elections and by insisting on compliance with the rules. 
 Completing this general picture characterizing both elections, each of 
the two case studies also identifies a series of specific characteristics and 
factors that can be relevant in the context of post-conflict elections. In Nepal, 
unlike in Sierra Leone where the system was purely majoritarian, the higher 
proportionality of the mixed electoral system and the associated quotas 
seems to have played an essential role. In Sierra Leone, the reform of the 
security sector contributed to a peaceful process, while such institutional 
change had not occurred yet in Nepal. 
 The research is structured as follows. First, we present a short overview 
of the literature on elections and violent conflict. We then conduct a case 
study of each of the cases separately before turning to a discussion of the 
findings from the two cases in parallel. The research strategy is the same for 
both cases. For the study of each of these cases we have relied on an analysis 
of the secondary literature – be it academic, election observation reports or 
other forms of documentation – as well as some primary sources such as 
press articles and legal documents5. This research strategy allows us to 
identify the most important factors thanks to the triangulation of different 
sources of information. The results of the analyses are presented following a 
similar structure for both cases. First, we provide descriptive information on 
the elections and their background. In a second step, the nature of the most 
visible threats to a peaceful conduct of the elections will be described. This 
allows us to assess the magnitude of the risk related to these elections and 
also what specific threats a particular factor or measure might have dissi-
pated. Third, the various lines of explanation for the peaceful conduct of the 
elections themselves will be reviewed. Both cases are discussed in the last 
section, which summarizes the main findings of the study and highlights the 
lessons learnt.  
5 While the diversity of documents analyzed 
gives a good overview of the various stages 
of the electoral process in these two 
cases, there are some information asym-
metries. In particular, many more reports 
and sources are available on the role of 
the electoral commission of Sierra Leone 
than on that of Nepal. We would also like 
to point out that the information published 
may be selective with some aspects of the 
electoral process being well documented 
(e.g. the assessment of election day which 
is usually well described in observati-
on reports) and some others not at all, 
especially if they relate to  sensitive issues 
such as, for example, negotiations. There-
fore, we may have missed some aspects 
that played an important role but were 
not covered in the extensive literature on 
which this report is based. 
Introduction
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Elections and 
violent conflict: 
a short overview
Several authors and institutions have attempted to develop analytical tools to 
assess the complex relationship between elections and violent conflict during 
the first decade of the 21st century, but progress on the development of a 
systematic, comprehensive theoretical framework has nevertheless been 
slow. As regards the definition of election-related violence, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, in his 2010 
report, provides a helpful overview of the proposals made by scholars. One 
aspect of the definition on which there appears to be general agreement is 
that election-related violence distinguishes itself from other political violence 
in that violence occurs in relation to an electoral process with the goal of 
influencing the electoral process and its outcomes (see Alston 2010). The 
factors of election-related violence are linked to both conditions pre-existing 
the electoral process and the elections themselves (see e.g. International 
IDEA 2010, which distinguishes between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ factors). In 
his review of the literature of election-related violence, Alston shows that the 
existing case studies of particular elections point to a wide range of different 
causes or enabling conditions of election-related violence including various 
individual benefits of holding public office; pre-existing political or ethnic 
rivalries; patronage links; existence of militias and weakness of the state, 
“lack of faith in the electoral commission or its independence; lack of 
awareness of the electoral process; political repression; forced disenfran-
chisement of opponents; poverty; lack of funding for the electoral process; 
and incitement” (Alston 2010, 11). 
 There have been attempts to construct a framework for election related 
violence that would encompass all these and other factors. For instance, 
Fischer (2002) developed a typology of election related conflict based on the 
different stages and events of the electoral process. He distinguishes 
between identity-, campaign-, balloting-, results-, and representation 
conflicts. Another approach has been that developed by Sisk and Spies (UNDP 
2009), who identify three elements to account for the root causes of election 
violence: the “context of democratization or political change in which violence 
occurs,” “the effects of electoral system choice on conflict dynamics” and 
“the nature and pattern of political mobilization.” They go on to list 51 
“analytical indicators”. In assessing the conditions enabling electoral 
violence, Höglund (2009) distinguishes between three areas in which the 
“precipitants of violence” can be found:  the “nature of politics”, the “nature of 
elections”, and “electoral institutions”. She also distinguishes between 
enabling conditions and triggers. Finally, taking a different approach, Brozus 
(2011) emphasizes the actors’ motivations to perpetrate violence. According to 
him the main goal of election-related violence can be either to manipulate 
elections or to delegitimize them. In his conceptualization, actors will use 
violence depending on the perceived costs and expected benefits of their 
actions and their consequences. 
9 While each of these conceptualizations provides interesting analytical 
tools for the study of election-related violence and shows the complexity of 
this process, their application for specific case studies remains a challenge 
mainly because of a lack of consensus and generalization regarding what and 
who causes election-related violence. Furthermore, the frameworks generally 
do not make systematic and thorough reference to empirical evidence. The 
problems associated with the frameworks may be the cause of why there are, 
to the best of our knowledge, no case studies that take any of the suggested 
frameworks as reference. 
 With regard to the measures that can be taken to prevent election-
related violence, even less systematic knowledge has been produced6. One of 
the reasons for this is the limited information available to researchers on this 
particular topic, which is due to its sensitivity. As Darnolf puts it in relation to 
international electoral assistance: “implementing organizations and 
individuals rarely publish any reports about their work, or speak in public” 
(Darnolf 2011, 378).
 What emerges from this short overview of the existing literature on the 
genesis of conflict in the context of elections is, on the one hand, the multi-
plicity of factors that play a role at the various stages of the process and, on 
the other, the lack of a comprehensive conceptual framework for their 
analysis. Based on this observation, the two case studies presented in the 
following sections draw on the existing literature but are not bound to a single 
conceptual framework. 
6 See however the UNDP elections and 
conflict prevention guide (2009) that 
comprises seven case studies, Elkit (2011), 
Svåsand (2011) or contributions included 
in Iff (2011), and the book on preventing 
electoral violence in Africa edited by Fra-
zer and Gimah-Boadi (2011). 
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2
Sierra Leone, 
2007 Presidential & 
Parliamentary Elections
In the summer of 2007, Sierra Leone held its second national elections after 
the civil war. The first round of the presidential election and the parliamentary 
election were held simultaneously on August 11th and the run off presidential 
election took place on September 7th. The election resulted in a relatively 
peaceful change in power despite a high risk of violence. 
 Sierra Leone experienced civil war in the years 1991-2002, which 
resulted in the death of approximately 50’000 people and the displacement of 
a very large share of the population (see Abdullah 2004). In 2002, presidential 
and parliamentary elections were organized with significant international 
assistance and under the auspices of the UN mission (UNAMSIL). These first 
elections after the civil war saw the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) gaining 
a comfortable majority in parliament and the presidency was won by the party 
leader Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who already held this position following the 1996 
election – before being removed from office by a military coup a year later. 
 Given that he had already served two terms as president – the 
maximum allowed by the constitution – Kabbah could not run in the 2007 
election. The SLPP therefore had to select a different candidate for the 
presidential election. The two main figures of the internal competition for 
candidacy within the SLPP were the vice president Solomon Berewa, and 
Charles Margai, the son of Albert Margai, a former Prime minister of Sierra 
Leone. After it became clear that Berewa would emerge as the winner, Margai 
decided to create a new party: the People’s Movement for Democratic Change 
(PMDC). This brought a third relatively large party into a competition that had 
traditionally been characterized by the dominance of two parties: the 
incumbent SLPP and the All People’s Congress (APC). It is this latter party 
which won the 2007 election and its leader, Ernest Bai Koroma, became 
President.7 
 In the 2007 parliamentary election, the country used a first-past-the-
post (FPTP) electoral system with single member districts. This was a change 
from the 2002 election in which, given lack of accurate census data after a 
long war period and thus the impossibility of drawing new electoral bound-
aries, a proportional electoral system was used, with each of the country’s  
14 districts being allocated 8 seats in the legislature, independently of their 
demographic weight. The return to a FPTP electoral system required new 
boundary delimitation and affected the distribution of seats. While generally  
a FPTP or “winner-takes-all” voting method tends to result in a greater 
disparity between the number of votes and the number of seats than propor-
tional electoral systems, in this specific case, the return to FPTP increased 
the correspondence between votes and seats because the proportional 
system it replaced had been so flawed. No major change was made to the 
rules governing the presidential election, and in 2007, as in previous elections, 
a two-round system with two leading candidates participating in a 2nd round 
(if no candidate receives more than 55%8  of the votes in the first) was used.  
7 For a descriptive account and detailed 
results of these elections see: Ohman 
(2008) and Wyrod (2008).
8 This very high qualified majority in the 
first round of the presidential election – 
allegedly unique in the world (see Golder 
2005) – already existed in the 1991 Cons-
titution.
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 While the elections were held in a relatively peaceful climate, some 
tensions arose notably before and during the second round of the presidential 
election. There were clashes between the supporters of SLPP and ACP as well 
as between SLPP and PMDC voters in several cities (see NDI 2007). President 
Kabbah even threatened to declare a state of emergency if violence and 
intimidations were not stopped.9 The tension also rose in the aftermath of the 
second round when the NEC decided to invalidate the results from 477 polling 
stations where ballot boxes had patently been stuffed as turnout was greater 
than 100%. As a majority of these were in the south and east, where a large 
proportion of SLPP voters were located, this decision was contested by 
Solomon Berewa’s supporters. However, the SLPP candidate accepted his 
defeat and, even though members of his party legally challenged the NEC’s 
decision, the tension did not rise any further and did not lead to widespread 
violence. 
2.1 Threats to the Electoral Process
The election represented a risk because of a series of factors associated both 
with the organization of the elections themselves and more generally with the 
context in which they took place. In this section, we present these main 
factors and discuss their role by describing first the factors associated with 
the context and then those that are linked to the electoral process itself.
2.1.1 The potential re-mobilization of ex-combatants
With regard to the context in which the elections took place, several factors 
could be seen as potentially increasing the likelihood of a violent outburst. The 
recent conflict history in Sierra Leone could have negative consequences for 
several reasons. First, it influenced individual values and social norms: at the 
end of a decade-long armed conflict in which horrendous atrocities had been 
committed, violence was widespread and largely perceived as a legitimate 
means to achieve one’s goals (see Steenkamp 2005). In that respect, the Sierra 
Leone case is emblematic as a “culture of violence” was actively generated by 
the RUF among the many young soldiers whom they enrolled by force and 
whom they accustomed and encouraged to commit violence: “brutality was 
encouraged and sometimes celebrated as a way to foster feckless loyalty to 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and to reinforce rank-and-file capacity to 
kill and mutilate” (Maclure and Denov 2006, 126). Second, war also increased 
vulnerability in the population. In particular, one of the consequences of the 
civil war was the displacement of a very large share of the population, a small 
part of which was not able to resettle after the war10. This impacted the 
structure of social networks, leaving many in a precarious situation. After the 
war, many ex-combatants were also left with little hope for a better future, 
thus representing an easy target for re-mobilization by political actors. With 
the elections approaching, the three major parties (SLPP, ACP and PMDC) did 
indeed recruit ex-combatants to serve their political goals (see Kandeh 2008; 
Christiansen and Utas 2008; Africa Research Institute 2011). 
9 See e.g. BBC news (28.08.2007): http://
news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/afri-
ca/6966339.stm [accessed 9 February 
2012]
10 For the year 1997 for instance, UNHCR 
estimate the number of internally dis-
placed people to be about 1,5 million, see: 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
(IDMC), Profile of Internal Displacement: 
Sierra Leone, 15 October 2003, availa-
ble at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3ae6a6340.html [accessed 9 Febru-
ary 2012]
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2.1.2  Corruption and patronage systems 
Beyond the legacies of the war, other structural factors facilitated the mobili-
zation of ex-combatants and more generally increased the risks associated 
with the election. The high level of corruption among political actors (see 
Kandeh 2008) meant that the potential gains from being elected were high and 
that political parties had, and were ready to invest, financial means in the 
political campaign, notably in hiring ex-combatants with the hope of gaining 
votes. The important potential benefits from holding public office also 
increased the likelihood of resorting to other means – potentially violent 
– beyond democratically legitimate instruments as there was much to win or 
lose from being in power. 
2.1.3  Political competition tightly linked to ethnic divides 
In addition to the high stakes for individual politicians, it has to be noted that 
the identity-based political cleavages could also, to some extent, increase the 
risks of violence. Despite the fact that ethnicity did not play a major role in the 
civil war, identity based discourses could possibly be used by political actors 
in the context of elections. Indeed, the political competition in Sierra Leone is 
characterized by partisan alignments that are closely linked to ethnicity and 
which, to a certain degree, overlap with geographical cleavages. The electoral 
base of the SLPP is predominantly among the ethnic group of the Mende, who 
are more numerous in the south and east of the country, while ACP voters tend 
to be from the Temne and Limba, who represent the majority of the population 
in the North. Such a party system that is tightly linked to ethnicity tends to 
increase the risk for violence as it is predominantly based on identity rather 
than political programs (see Horowitz 1985, p 346 ff.). On the one hand such a 
party system is likely to reinforce ethnic fragmentation. On the other, and in 
particular when coupled with an FPTP, winner-takes-all system, minority 
ethnic groups have little chance of gaining a substantial representation 
through the electoral process and are therefore more likely to use violence  
as a means to achieve their goals (see Basedau and Moroff 2011, 207).  
2.1.4  Potentially confrontational changes in the electoral system and 
electoral administration
With regard to the organization of the elections themselves, several sources  
of risk have to be pointed out. First, the electoral system used in the 2007 
parliamentary election differed from that used in the previous election. While 
there was little debate about the choice of electoral system11,  its implemen-
tation, in particular the boundary delimitation process, was harshly criticized 
by some parties (see e.g. Jalloh 2006; Yamba 2006) who felt that they would be 
losing seats under the new rules. Indeed, one of the consequences of the 
electoral system change was that the least populated districts, notably those 
in the south of the country, would lose representatives as compared to the 
previous election, in which the demographic weight of each district was not 
taken into consideration. It is also worth noting that while the electoral system 
used in the 2007 election did provide a closer correspondence between the 
number of votes and the number of seats as compared to the previous 
 11 The change did not result from a reform 
but rather from a return to a previous-
ly agreed upon system after special 
provisions had to be adopted in the 2002 
election because of a lack of census data 
that would allow delimiting constituenci-
es.
Sierra Leone, 2007 Presidential & Parliamentary Elections
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election, one of its consequences was to increase the gender gap, as women 
tend to be disadvantaged in majoritarian electoral systems (seen Castillejo 
2009; EUEOM 2007).
 A second potentially destabilizing factor was the restructuring of the 
election management body (EMB). The institution responsible for organizing 
the elections is the National Electoral Commission (NEC). The 2002 National 
Electoral Commission Act gave the NEC the power to recruit its own staff, 
which had not been possible previously. This resulted in the restructuring of 
the commission that started in 2005 with the appointment of Christiana 
Thorpe at its head. One of the consequences of this restructuring was an 
important turnover in personnel as the formerly appointed civil servants were 
replaced by personnel hired directly by the commission. This measure has 
been considered as crucial in establishing the NEC legitimacy. In addition to 
the restructuration of the NEC, a new commission responsible for the party 
registration process was also created relatively shortly before the election. 
The role of the Political Party Registration Commission (PPRC) is to manage 
the party registration and to engage in mediation between political parties. 
While the constitution of 1991 already theoretically required the existence of a 
body responsible for the oversight of political parties that is independent from 
the NEC, the PPRC was only created in 2006 (see Jinadu 2011). It was thus the 
first time that this commission had to deal with the registration of parties and 
was, according to some observers, largely understaffed and underfunded 
(Jinadu 2011).
 While the restructuring of the existing institutions and the creation of 
new ones were necessary and intended to increase their legitimacy, improve 
their capacity to organize the elections and clarify the role of the various 
actors involved, these transformations also conveyed some risks. In 
particular, the appointment of new staff12 or the role of the new PPRC 
commission could be contested during the various stages of the electoral 
cycle. Moreover, both the NEC and PPRC had relatively little time to prepare 
the elections in which they were to play an instrumental role. The amount of 
tasks to be completed in a relatively short time was also very large taking into 
consideration that the NEC had to create new boundary delimitation and 
organize voter registration.
2.1.5  Logistical difficulties in organizing the elections
An additional factor cited in the various pre-election reports was the logistical 
difficulty of organizing the election. The NEC did not have all the financial 
resources it needed (International Crisis Group 2007a, p. 7). Observers were 
also particularly concerned that the timing of the election – which was to be 
held in the middle of the rainy season – would increase the difficulties in 
organizing the poll, particularly due to transportation difficulties (Interna-
tional Crisis Group  2007a, 7). The fears were particularly linked to the reaction 
of those who could not reach polling stations or to the potential delays this 
could have caused, which would hinder the credibility of the results. 
  
12 While we did not find any documentation 
of tensions with regard to the partiality of 
the NEC prior to the elections, it appeared 
after the election that some members of 
the NEC commission were openly pro-
SLPP (see Kandeh, 2008). In between the 
two rounds of the presidential election 
as well as after the announcement of the 
results, the commission was criticized for 
being pro-APC by some newspapers. 
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2.1.6  Unclear electoral law and inconsistent application
Observers also noted some drawbacks in the application of the electoral law 
that could lead to an electoral dispute. Indeed, President Kabbah only 
announced the date of the elections - which were at the time expected to be 
held on July 28th 2007 – in August 2006. This late announcement of the 
election date “triggered complaints from some civil servants. According to the 
1991 constitution, civil servants must resign their positions 12 months prior to 
the polling day in order to run as candidates. As the date for the 2007 poll was 
declared less than a year before the elections, those civil servants that would 
otherwise have been interested in running for elective office could no longer 
file their candidacies within the constitutional timeframe” (National 
Democratic Institute 2007a, 4). As a result, the eligibility of some candidates 
was unclear. For instance, it is only a few weeks before the election that the 
Supreme Court confirmed the eligibility of Solomon Berewa after it had been 
challenged based on this law. It also appears that the law has been applied 
inconsistently (see Kandeh 2008, 609).
 In sum, several lines of reasoning point to the fact that the 2007 
elections were perceived as carrying an important risk for the emergence of 
violent conflict, which is reflected in the various pre-election reports that 
point out the numerous threats to the peaceful conduct of elections. In 
particular, structural factors linked to the enduring effects of the civil war, 
which created a potential for re-mobilization, the high level of corruption and 
thus important potential gains (or losses) from being elected (or not), the 
changes in the electoral system and in the electoral administration that could 
lead to dispute, the lack of clarity with regard to the application of some laws, 
the difficulties linked to the logistical organization of the elections, all repre-
sented important threats to the peaceful conduct of the elections.
2.2  Factors Contributing to Relatively Peaceful 
Elections
There are many factors that may have played a role in preventing violent 
conflict during the various stages of the electoral cycle. In this section, we 
discuss some of the main factors that have been identified as potentially 
playing a role in that process. 
 The literature provides different readings of the relatively peaceful 
outcome of the 2007 elections in Sierra Leone, but there seems to be a general 
agreement that high levels of perceived legitimacy of the elections played a 
crucial role in avoiding the conflict (see Ohman 2008; Wyrod 2008). Key to this 
legitimacy was the fair organization of the elections which was possible 
thanks to the involvement of several institutional actors. In particular, an 
important role was played by the NEC, by the PPRC as well as by the security 
forces within the country. 
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2.2.1  Political cleavages did not overlap with previous conflict lines
The main political cleavages in the 2007 elections were not overlapping with 
the cleavages present during the civil war. One of the main actors of the civil 
war – the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) – disappeared from the political 
scene in Sierra Leone and did not get a single seat in the parliament in the 
2002 election, nor did it participate in the 2007 election. As a result, the main 
parties competing in the election cannot be directly linked to the actors 
involved in the armed conflict. For instance, the two major parties hired 
commanders from the same rebel group (see Africa Research Institute 2011). 
In addition to this, the length of the previous conflict might also have in a way 
prevented further violence as many actors could feel a “conflict fatigue” and 
disillusionment with the political elites. In their study of remobilized 
ex-combatants during the 2007 election, Christiansen and Utas (2008, 536) 
show that while ex-combatants were ready to join security squads during the 
campaign and election, they did not trust politicians and were not likely to 
remain faithful should they not see benefits from their actions. As the authors 
put it: “Rather than blindly trusting the promises of presidential candidates, 
remobilized ex-combatants argued that politicians would continue to fail them 
– as had happened during the war and again when the peace was declared.”
2.2.2 The positive role of the Electoral Commission
Regarding the NEC, its actions were almost unanimously applauded by 
observers of the elections (European Union Election Observation Mission 
2007; National Democratic Institute 2007b; Department for international 
Development and UKaid 2008). Indeed, despite a difficult task, the NEC 
managed to organize the election efficiently and communicate about the 
election in a transparent and inclusive manner. Among the important achieve-
ments of the commission were the drawing of new electoral boundaries, the 
efficient and relatively comprehensive registration of voters, the good admin-
istration of the elections themselves and the transparent communication 
throughout the process. It has to be noted however that some irregularities 
also occurred, especially during the second round of the presidential election 
in which turnout was over 100% in several constituencies. The NEC took the 
decision to nullify the results of 477 voting centers. This was a courageous and 
contested decision. Most of these polling stations were situated in the SLPP 
strongholds, in particular in the south and the east of the country. This 
decision was not welcomed by SLPP who filed a complaint. However, taking 
this decision was important for the legitimacy of the election. The positive 
impact of the Commission’s work is attributable to the following factors, some 
of which are directly related to the involvement of the international 
community. Among the most important factors were:  
Personality and nomination procedure of the commission chairperson:  
The commission is composed of five members who are nominated by the 
President and appointed by the Parliament. It is led by a chairperson and its 
four members represent the country’s four regions. The members of the 
commission are meant to be apolitical.  The nomination of commission chair 
followed consultations with all parties by President Kabbah. It was then 
unanimously approved by parliament. In addition to an inclusive nomination 
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process, the personality and experience of the chairperson gave legitimacy to 
her appointment and certainly also had an important influence on the 
commission’s actions. A former nun, government minister and social activist, 
Christiana Thorpe had the confidence of most political actors and showed a 
very strong leadership throughout the election cycle. It is difficult to assess 
whether the gender of the commission chair influenced her ability to gain the 
trust of political leaders, but it is certainly worth mentioning that the five 
member commission included three women (Jinandu 2011).
Restructuring and personnel recruitment:  
Following the local elections of 2004 in which important irregularities were 
documented13, the NEC underwent a restructuring process which led to an 
important turnover in personnel both at the head of the commission and 
among the lower-rank employees. According to observers, the recruitment of 
staff has strengthened the NEC human resources with highly educated and 
competent people joining the commission (see International Crisis Group 
2007a, p.6-7).
Collaboration and cooperation with other institutions:  
The commission chairperson sat on the National Security Council as well as on 
the board of PPRC. This is illustrative of the fact that there has been a tight 
collaboration between the important institutions involved in elections, which 
enabled a good coordination and information flow. The NEC also tightly 
collaborated with the UN and together with domestic stakeholders: 
“Throughout the electoral process, the Executive Representative of the 
Secretary-General, Mr. Victor Angelo, and the NEC Chairperson jointly chaired 
meetings bringing together domestic and international stakeholders” (ACE 
2007). In addition to this, the NEC also established a Political Party Liaison 
Committee (PPLC) whose main purpose was to communicate and explain the 
NEC decisions to the political parties. The PPLC was also able to gather 
feedback from political parties some of which was later taken into account by 
the NEC14. 
Efficient staff training:  
the NEC hired 37,243 polling staff for the elections. This temporary staff was 
trained on the day before the election by Presiding Officers who had previously 
been trained at a 3-day workshop by the district officer (Commonwealth 
Observer Group 2007). A second training was organized ahead of the second 
round of the presidential election. While some observers highlighted that the 
training was planned too late given that the polling procedures were only 
ready by mid-July (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2007) or that 
the training was diverse in terms of quality depending on the polling station 
(Commonwealth Observer Group 2007), the generally professional attitude of 
the polling staff was welcomed in most observation reports.
Transparency and communication with the media:  
The NEC had transparent communication with various actors during the 
electoral process. As stated above, the NEC established a PPLC, which 
13 As noted by the International Crisis Group 
in its pre-election report: “The current 
body was set up after an IFES report 
on the 2004 local government elections 
detailed irregularities, including blatant 
ballot rigging by all parties, so extensive 
that IFES, donors and the government 
agreed to withhold publication and the 
UK Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID) kept back part of its budget 
support for the government.” (Internatio-
nal Crisis Group 2007a, 6). 
14 One such case reported in the EU obser-
vers’ report: “Key changes to the election 
preparations were undertaken as a result 
of the PPLC consultations. In one such 
case the APC objected to the originally 
intended order of presidential candidates 
on the ballot paper for the presidential 
election, thus challenging a format with 
the SLPP candidate in the first posi-
tion. The NEC subsequently changed 
the sequence on the ballot papers to 
accommodate the APC’s demands by 
listing candidates in alphabetical order of 
their parties as in the previous elections.” 
(European Union Election Observation 
Mission. 2007, 13).
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enabled good communication with political parties. The NEC also held 
numerous press conferences and generally communicated clearly about the 
election. An example of measures that increased the transparency in the 
elections was posting a copy of the polling station result form outside of the 
polling station (see e.g. National Democratic Institute 2007b, p. 33).   
2.2.3  The positive role of the Political Parties Registration Commission
Another important institution was the PPRC, which was created following a 
request of the NEC. The PPRC managed the registration of political parties and 
candidates. It also managed the drafting and the signing by political parties of 
a Code of Conduct. The PPRC also established a National Code of Conduct 
Monitoring Committee which included representatives from the NEC, the 
police, civil society as well as each of the political parties. This committee 
which was also present at the regional level “became an effective platform for 
dialogue and problem-solving between political parties during the election 
period. It functioned as a forum for discussion of issues of common concern, 
including breaches of the code before, during and after the elections.” (Jinadu 
2011, 235) Even though all parties signed this code of conduct and even though 
the party registration generally seems to have gone smoothly, the PPRC faced 
several challenges including its funding and its ability to sanction parties that 
would not fulfill their promises. It has been pointed out that the PPRC had no 
means to take action against political parties (see e.g. Kandeh 2008) and that 
it was perceived as a “junior partner of the NEC” (Jinadu 2011, p. 222). It is 
difficult to assess the effectiveness of the code of conduct. On the one hand, 
it is clear that on some occasions it was not respected (see Kandeh 2008), on 
the other hand, although not effectively binding, this code of conduct may 
have played an important role in directly involving the various parties in the 
process and showing them their responsibility for the peaceful conduct of the 
election.
2.2.4  Security sector reform and international support
Throughout the process, the NEC and PPRC were supported by the interna-
tional community. The most important contributions were material as well as 
organizational and advisory. The NEC indeed drew a large part of its budget 
from the international community (approx. 70% of its $20 million  budget). The 
financial contribution of the international community was crucial to the 
efficiency of the commission which had been underfunded at the beginning  
of its activities as the funding of the commission by the Sierra Leone state 
arrived after much delay (National Democratic Institute 2007c). The UN 
provided some logistical assistance by delivering voting materials to polling 
centers using its helicopters. It also advised the NEC in several areas including 
the electoral budget, the planning of the different phases of election organi-
zation and the design of polling materials (ACE 2007).  Moreover the UN 
Integrated Office in Sierra Leone together with the UN Development Program 
initiated an electoral media code of conduct that was signed by the Sierra 
Leone Association of Journalists.  
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 In addition to the good functioning of the EMB, some reports stress the 
role of much improved security during the campaign and the election itself 
(UNDP 2009, pp. 87-93). “It is widely acknowledged in Sierra Leone and abroad 
that the successful elections were a testament to the efficiency of the police, 
headed by Inspector General Brima Acha Kamara, who deployed well-trained 
forces, anticipated potential outbreaks and used nonlethal crowd control 
methods” (International Crisis Group 2008a, 2).  Prior to the election, the 
police benefitted from “new training focused on crowd control and related 
activities relevant to the elections” (International Crisis Group 2007a, 13) 
which was coordinated with the UN police section. Although not directly 
mobilized for the elections, the army also proved loyal during the electoral 
process, which could tentatively be attributed to the important reform it had 
undergone under the auspices of international community and the UK in 
particular. 
2.2.5  A tightly networked diplomatic community speaking with one 
voice pressured for peaceful elections
Beyond the organization of the elections, some authors also stressed the 
importance of international pressure. In that respect, a series of factors can 
be identified. First, the international community was well networked and 
unanimous in its actions. This became apparent in particular at the time of the 
second round of the presidential election when “the SLPP leadership had to 
be persuaded that it had lost the 2007 elections and needed to surrender the 
presidency to the APC. Even the Ambassadors of the People’s Republic of 
China and Iran, which did not provide electoral support, joined in the effort of 
persuasion. Such broad networks of consensus are central to the effec-
tiveness of international support for good governance” (Department for 
International Development 2008, 3). Second, the country’s heavy dependence 
on international funding might also have played a role. Indeed, as the national 
budget relies principally on international donors and financial institutions, all 
political actors had to take into account the stands of the international 
community. Tentatively, the reliance of the national budget on the interna-
tional community also lowered the incentive for fraud in the elections as in 
such case it would have been likely that international institutions would have 
suspended their funding. 
 While it is difficult to assess the contribution of each of the factors 
presented here to the peaceful conduct of the election, this overview enables 
us to suggest some of the measures that may have played a positive role in the 
electoral process. One of the key challenges in the Sierra Leone elections was 
organizing credible elections after a massive involvement of the international 
community in the 2002 elections and the widespread fraud in the 2004 
regional elections. In that respect, the 2007 elections were generally 
successful. Several institutional actors were identified as playing a key role. 
Particularly, the election management body, the security forces and a well 
networked and well coordinated donor community have been highlighted as 
important actors in this specific case.  More precisely, the case study has 
shown that some innovative institutional arrangements can help to increase 
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the legitimacy of elections. First, the restructuring of the NEC and the 
commissioner nomination procedure provided a renewed legitimacy to the 
commission, which it was able to retain by conducting the elections 
efficiently. Second, the creation of various platforms for exchange and 
dialogue with and between political parties – such as the Code of Conduct 
Monitoring Committee or the PPRC – helped in creating arenas of dialogue 
which enabled information flow and feedback from political parties to the 
EMB. Third, the new organization of the EMB which was composed of the NEC 
and the PPRC has provided a useful separation of roles enabling the NEC to 
keep some distance with political parties. At the same time, this arrangement 
might have created some ambiguities with regard to the role played by each 
institution. This potential problem seems to have been overcome by a good 
coordination between the various committees implicated in the elections, 
which was made possible thanks to the presence of members of the NEC in 
the other commissions (PPRC and security commission). Fourth, the interna-
tional community played an important role in assisting the various institutions 
and has been well coordinated and unanimous in its actions. More generally, 
the case of the 2007 elections in Sierra Leone also showed the ability of the 
United Nations to empower local actors while granting them substantial 
support. In that respect these elections were a crucial step in establishing 
sustainable institutions that could run future elections. 
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3
Nepal – 2008 Constituent 
Assembly Elections
On 10 April 2008, after two postponements, more than 60% of eligible 
Nepalese elected a Constituent Assembly that would act as the interim 
legislature for a term of two years and in particular write a new constitution.  
It was the first election after the civil war, which for ten years had pitted the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) against the monarchy and which had 
officially come to an end through the signature of a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement on November 21, 2006. While no single party won the majority, the 
Maoists gained most votes and thus – to the surprise of most observers – left 
the electoral contest as clear winners. 
 The elections were at the time, and still are today, widely regarded as a 
success and an essential step forward in the Nepal peace process: observers 
went as far as to term them “a triumph of democratic impulse rooted in the 
primacy of ballots over bullets” (FES 2008, 1) or “a crucial step toward 
inclusive democracy and a peaceful new Nepal” (DEAN 2008, 5). This positive 
assessment is mostly related to the fact that polling day was largely peaceful 
and that the entire process did not result in a relapse into armed conflict, 
despite the fact that there was not only a transfer of power, but also a change 
in the political system. Indeed, roughly a month after the elections, the 
Monarchy was abolished and Nepal was declared a Republic. Four years on 
the country remains at peace – even though crucial aspects of the 2006 peace 
agreement remain to be implemented, such as the promulgation of the new 
federal constitution and the integration and rehabilitation of former Maoist 
combatants. 
 It is similarly undisputed, however, that the campaign period leading to 
the elections was marred by violence and violations of the electoral code of 
conduct. EU observers (EUEOM 2008, 4) reported “numerous incidents of 
violence involving political parties” during the campaign period, which 
occurred in a “general climate of fear and intimidation,” The Carter Center 
(TCC 2008, 3) said this period was “plagued with intermittent violence and 
violations of the electoral code of conduct” and DEAN, a coalition of Nepal 
civil society organizations, spoke of “widespread violence and intimidation” 
(DEAN 2008, 3). In line with this paper’s focus on situations where violence and 
conflict was averted, this section thus assesses the factors contributing to 
the prevention of violence and conflict that could have emerged as a result of 
the electoral process, and in its aftermath, rather than as a part of, and during 
the process15.  
 This section first examines the types and magnitude of factors that 
observers identified as threats to the viability of peaceful, non-violent change 
in the country and then attempts to list the factors and interventions that 
contributed to preventing the materialization of these threats. It needs to be 
stressed here that literature analyzing the causes of the success of the 2008 
Elections in Nepal is scarce. Election observation reports (EUEOM 2008, TCC 
2008, DEAN 2008) certainly contain much useful information, but their focus is 
on international standards of election administration rather than with conflict 
 15  This distinction is important for policy 
makers as the respective causes and 
dynamics – and thus also the tools for 
prevention and mitigation of violence 
and conflict – differ widely between the 
former (e.g. violent inter-ethnic clashes 
such as in Kenya in 2007) and the latter 
(e.g. intimation of voters by the ruling 
party such as in Zimbabwe in 2008).
Various scholars have categorized various 
types of electoral violence and conflict 
according to various phases of the elec-
toral cycle. UNDP (2009, 20-21) lists five 
phases; IFES (2002, 3) five different ones. 
Höglund’s three (2009, 418) of pre-polling, 
polling and post-polling, are used here.
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dynamics. Interestingly, most observers spent more time analyzing the “shock 
results” (ICG 2008b, 18) and reasons behind the Maoists’ success than the 
reasons behind the absence of post-election violence and conflict. 
3.1  Threats to the Electoral Process
On April 2, 2008, a few days before Election Day, the ICG (2008b, i) stated that 
the “elections […] are likely to go ahead […] but political unrest and violence 
could mar – or even derail – preparations, and the aftermath could bring 
turbulence.” A brief look at the history of Nepal’s internal armed conflict is 
warranted for a better understanding of the context in which the electoral 
process took place, and to identify threats external to the process that had 
the potential to trigger violence and conflict. 
 The civil war in Nepal started in February 1996 with an ultimatum –  
and subsequent attacks – by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) to the 
coalition government under the Nepali Congress to implement a “40 Point 
Demand”.16  These demands, grouped under sections on “nationalism,” 
“democracy,” and “livelihood,” aimed at a fundamental reform of Nepal’s 
governance. They included, among others, the abolition of the monarchy and 
the drafting of a new constitution by democratically elected representatives 
of the people. The Maoists, a left-wing group, had grown increasingly 
frustrated with the poor responsiveness of government to what they perceived 
to be the needs of the Nepali people. Since the restoration of multi-party 
democracy in 1990, ruling coalitions had risen and fallen in rapid succession, 
the various governments being accused of incompetence and corruption. 
The internal armed conflict that ensued and that was to last for an entire 
decade created tremendous suffering among the Nepali people. More than 
13,000 people died, and all parties to the conflict – be it the military police, 
the royal army or the Maoists – committed grave human rights violations. Over 
the years, the Maoists came to dominate rural areas and villages, while the 
government largely retained control over district centers and cities. In the 
early years of the conflict, the government response was primarily left to the 
police. 
 Conflict dynamics shifted in 2001 when King Birendra was killed in a 
massacre at the royal palace. He was replaced by his unpopular brother 
Gynendra, who in 2002 dismissed the elected Prime Minister and for the first 
time engaged the Royal Nepal Army in the armed conflict with the Maoists. In 
2005, dissatisfied with the course of events, he stripped the parliament of 
most powers and effectively declared an end to democracy. This “coup,” 
however, resulted in the King’s isolation. That same year, seven parties 
represented in parliament (the “Seven-Party Alliance” or SPA17) reached an 
agreement with the Maoists. In early 2006, hundreds of thousands of Nepali 
citizens took to the streets in a second “democratic movement.”18  It forced 
the King to return power to parliament and paved the way for the Compre-
hensive Peace Accord (CPA) signed in November 2006 by the Nepal 
 16  For an analysis of the demands see ICG 
(2005), including the actual text on page 
40. 
17  The SPA consists of the centrist par-
ties of the Nepali Congress (NC), Nepali 
Congress (Democratic), Nepal Sadbhava-
na Party (NSP-A) and four leftist parties 
- Communist Party of Nepal-Unified 
Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), United 
People's Front-Nepal (UPF-N), United 
Left Front (ULF) and Nepal Workers and 
Peasants Party (NWPP). Based largely on 
strong personalities, it was formed with 
the aim of resisting the takeover of power 
by the king.
18 The first, named “Jana Andolan”, had 
taken place in 1990 as a multiparty mo-
vement that brought an end to absolute 
monarchy and eliminated the panchayat 
system (local self-government at the 
village or small town level).
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 19 Bächler was Peace Building Advisor 
assigned by the Swiss Government and 
closely involved in the continuous negoti-
ations.
20 For a detailed account of the five fragile 
links see Swiss Peace Policy 1/2008, pp. 
34-44. As these factors cover the entire 
electoral process and not only the viabi-
lity of the election results, two of them  
are not mentioned  here: the inadequacy 
of the interim government (since this 
would in fact motivate actors to value 
the elections as a means to change the 
government) and the situation of the 
Maoist army in the cantonments (since 
this influenced two other ‘links’: violence 
during the campaign period and the viola-
tion of the code of conduct, and they are 
thus treated under that heading below). 
Government and the Maoists. The agreement satisfied the Maoist’s two key 
demands listed above: it stripped the King of his political powers and 
scheduled elections for a constituent assembly in June 2007. In early 2007, a 
new Interim Constitution was promulgated and the Maoists entered the Nepal 
Government. 
 It is thus important to note that by the time the Nepali Constituent 
Assembly elections took place, the defeat of the King had transformed the 
political landscape. The parties that were going to compete against each other 
in the elections were united in their opposition to the King. While an important 
threat to peaceful elections was thus removed, others were still very much 
present, and new factors emerged – or became visible as they had merely 
been covered by other factors – as the following shows. 
3.1.1  Newly visible cleavages and persistent distrust between political 
parties
Once the common enemy – the monarchy – had been defeated, the underlying 
rifts among the parties emerged, in particular between the SPA and the 
Maoists. Even though all of them were able to unite behind the common vision 
of a democratic Nepal, the actual implementation of this vision was subject to 
fierce negotiations in a fragile environment where confidence between the 
actors was yet to be built. As Bächler19 (FDFA 2008, 44) noted with regard to 
the disputes on the date and form of the elections: “the disputes […] are a 
clear expression of a problem that already represented an obstacle 
throughout the entire peace process: a lack of trust between the parties in the 
conflict.” The mistrust between the parties, and the resulting fragility of the 
peace process, is also the subject of two policy briefs by the International 
Crisis Group in September and December 2007 (ICG 2007a, 2007b). Bächler 
lists this situation as the first in five “fragile links in a complex chain of 
processes” that made elections “a risky undertaking.”20 The rift he identified, 
in particular between the Nepali Congress Party (NC) and the Maoists, was 
caused by a mutual disillusionment about the political intentions of the other. 
While the NC hoped to “tame” the Maoists by bringing them into the elections 
and was thus disappointed by the latter’s fierce campaign rhetoric, the 
Maoists struggled to trust that the NC would be ready for the political, social 
and economic reforms it aimed at. This situation in which “initial pragmatism 
made way for an ideological burdening of the politics of transition” (FDFA 
2008, 39) must be seen as part of the differentiation between parties that is 
usually triggered by an electoral process. This troubled relationship between 
the Maoists and the Seven-party Alliance became most clearly apparent with 
the Maoist walk-out from government in September 2007. 
3.1.2  The inadequate implementation of the peace agreement
The lack of trust between the major political parties is both a cause and a 
result of the lack of implementation of multiple agreements. The ICG identified 
the weakness of the peace process as a key factor that could destabilize the 
electoral process (2008b, 22). Bächler (FDFA 2008, 39)  summarized the 
situation in late 2007: “the controversial mandate for the Truth and 
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Reconciliation Commission has not been approved, the commission set up for 
the restructuring of the state apparatus has never been called on, the reform 
of the security sector has been postponed, the issue relating to missing 
persons has been ignored, numerous internally displaced persons are still 
awaiting repatriation, and the arrangements with the Madhesi and indigenous 
peoples have been shelved.” While one could argue that the timeline set by the 
CPA for the implementation of its provisions was utterly unrealistic, the threat 
that the situation represented for the elections remained. Indeed, every 
unimplemented aspect of the CPA could have been used and abused by 
potential spoilers as a justification to thwart the peace process.  
3.1.3  The continued existence of the two armed actors who fought the war
The inadequate implementation of the peace agreement was particularly 
problematic in the security sector. The CPA had called for the integration of 
the Maoist combatants into the Nepali Army. According to the ICG, however, 
both the state and the Maoist armies were “intact, as strong as ever and ready 
to fight if necessary” (ICG 2008b, 21) at the time of the elections. Such a 
situation is generally troubling in any context because it reduces the obstacles 
to renewed armed conflict. However, as outlined further below, armies and 
arms were at least stationed in “barracks” (Nepal Army) and “cantonments” 
(Maoists) and monitored by the UN mission. 
3.1.4  An overly ambitious timeline, premature elections 
From the very moment the CPA was signed, observers of the Nepal peace 
process generally agreed that its implementation timeline was unrealistic (e.g. 
ICG 2006, 23). This was particularly true with regard to the elections, which not 
only would require the passing of various laws but also the delimitation of 
constituencies, the registration of voters, parties and candidates, as well as 
extensive civic education campaigns – to name just a few essential elements 
of the process, each of which was foreseen to entail lengthy negotiations. 
Premature elections thus threatened the viability of the results in two ways: 
by potentially reducing their credibility and by potentially limiting the inclu-
siveness of the process and perceived ownership by all actors. 
3.1.5  Newly visible conflict cleavages between armed groups and the state
The end of the monarchy, the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement and the related opening up of the political space revealed existing 
structural conflict cleavages, in particular those between marginalized 
geographic areas and ethnic groups and the state. Numerous new protest 
movements, by a wide range of different groups, perhaps represented the 
most important threat to the elections (see e.g. ICG November 2007). These 
groups’ violent activities seemed motivated by their perception that this would 
be the only effective way to attract the attention of the interim government, as 
the successful struggle of the Maoists had shown. At the same time, these 
groups had grown disillusioned with the Maoists, whom they perceived to 
renege on the promises made during the armed conflict (see for example ICG 
2007 July, 18 f). These protests mostly emerged in the marginalized and 
ethnically diverse Terai region and the most significant movements were 
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dominated by the Madhesi, i.e. the ethnic group which held the most severe 
grievances related to political, social, cultural and economic discrimination 
and exclusion. In late 2007, observers still wrote that “the Maoists, the NC and 
India all fail to accurately estimate the importance of the Terai protests and 
the Madhesi movement” (see e.g. FDFA 2008, 41) and while the government 
had by then negotiated with over twenty groups, the UN still listed “violence 
by groups opposed to the elections” as a major threat to peaceful elections 
(United Nations Mission in Nepal 2008a, 2008b, 2008c).
3.1.6  The violence during the campaign and violations of the code of conduct
In August 2007, USIP (2007) published the findings of a needs assessment for 
election security. It identified the Nepal Police (NP), the primary security 
agency for law and order, as the key agency responsible for election security 
with the Armed Police Force (APF, created in 2000 specifically to combat the 
Maoist Insurgency) being deployed as back-up. The main concerns expressed 
by USIP were an unclear chain of command between the APF and the Nepal 
Army, and that the APF had not been trained in election security or law and 
order operating procedures. USIP also listed the lack of resources as a 
challenge. USIP did cite a lack of public trust in the police, due to “inability of 
the police to maintain security, insufficient representation by certain ethnic or 
caste groups in the police, police abuses, police corruption or corruption at 
other justice sector levels that trickles down to the police, lack of respon-
siveness by police to certain crimes (e.g. rape), or a misunderstanding by the 
public of why certain cases were not pursued” (USIP 2007). ICG further 
questioned police neutrality, stating that it was “historically biased towards 
the NC, which also holds the home ministry and so has operational control of 
all security forces.” However, neither USIP nor the ICG listed the involvement 
of the APF in the armed conflict with the Maoists as a major concern. 
 The security situation seemed to deteriorate the longer the pre-election 
period lasted (see UNMIN’s three election reports, published between March 
22 and April 6, 2008). Violence and other violations of the electoral code of 
conduct – be it by groups opposed to the elections in general, by parties 
participating in the elections but trying to influence the results, or by groups 
pursuing their usual criminal activities – represented a serious threat to the 
credibility of the elections, therefore to the viability of their results and 
eventually to the peace process as a whole.
3.2  Factors Contributing to the Prevention of Relapse 
of Armed Conflict
In light of the numerous, significant threats outlined above, it is rather 
surprising that polling day was carried out in a largely peaceful atmosphere 
and – even more importantly – that all parties and groups accepted the 
results and continued to stay engaged in the peace process. An examination  
of the Nepal case seems to indicate that while the various actors appeared to 
consider legitimate many means to influence the outcome of the elections, 
they were not prepared to reject this outcome. 
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3.2.1  The perceived stakes were high but not fatally high, and they were 
sequenced
The 2008 elections were of tremendous importance for Nepal’s political 
parties. They were among the most essential demands that the Maoists had 
fought for, and the Constitution that the elected assembly was meant to draft 
was perceived to carry the potential of fundamentally changing Nepal, not just 
politically, but also economically and socially. The violence that accompanied 
the campaigning phase can be interpreted as an indicator of the importance of 
these elections. 
 The stakes of these elections were thus high, and yet there were checks 
to the power of the victors – and thus safeguards limiting the impact of defeat 
for the losers. The two-thirds majority required to make decisions on constitu-
tional affairs made it nearly impossible for one or even two parties acting 
together to impose their will on the others. Consensus among a quite large 
number of parties would be required to make decisions. 
 That the executive branch of government was not directly elected by the 
people, coupled with the fact that no party reached an absolute majority, may 
also have contributed to stability. Indeed, in order to secure the right to form 
the government, the parties were forced to cooperate with others and to form 
coalitions. As defeat didn't imply fatal consequences for the losers, the 
motivation of actors to engage in violence was reduced, and an important 
threat was thus defused. In retrospect, it is worth noting that despite winning 
a plurality of votes, the Maoists’ candidate was defeated when the 
Constituent Assembly elected the new President of Nepal in July 2008. They 
did however secure the post of Prime Minister a month later.
3.2.2  The Maoists won, but not an absolute majority
Ahead of the elections, a severe Maoist defeat was considered the biggest 
threat to peace by most observers. The International Crisis Group spoke of 
“near universal expectations” that the Maoists would “fare poorly” in the 
elections and suggested that they may be “tempted to reject the entire 
election” (ICG 2008 April, 7). Immediately before polling day The Economist 
(2008), also questioning whether the Maoists would accept the results, even 
went so far as to quote a rumor of a minimum quota of 80 seats out of 601 for 
the Maoists’ “continued commitment to democracy” – while expressing 
uncertainty about the outcome of the elections. Observers were strengthened 
in their belief that a Maoist defeat would jeopardize peace both by the 
Maoists’ rhetoric and their actions. They had threatened numerous times, 
publicly, that they could return to war in the case of an unfavorable result. 
According to the International Crisis Group, this may have even motivated 
some voters to vote for them (ICG 2008 July, 2).
 The (limited) Maoist victory thus removed a major threat. As the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation noted in a 2010 Report on Election and Conflict in 
Nepal: “The parties that believe in the parliamentary system have demon-
strated their skill in persuading the UCPN (Maoist) to join the democratic 
struggle, with support from civil society and the international community. 
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 21 While the fifth amendment to the Cons-
titution, passed in July 2008, states that 
the President, who is supreme com-
mander of the Nepalese Army, shall be 
appointed by consensus among Consti-
tuent Assembly members, it also states 
that a simple majority suffices in case a 
consensus cannot be reached. 
22 See for example a reliefweb posting on 
April 7, 2008: “UNMIN chief says no to 
army deployment during polls” http://reli-
efweb.int/node/261855
23 These calculations, made by the authors, 
are based on the official results publis-
hed by the National Elections Commissi-
on and available at http://www.election.
gov.np/EN/
They were able to bring the Maoists in to sign a peace accord, participate in 
the election and become an agent of peaceful social transformation.” (FES 
2010, 8)
 However, had the Maoists won an absolute majority, this would have 
carried a significant conflict potential as well. It would have implied that the 
Maoists could form a government on their own and that they would control the 
army21. While it is impossible to know whether or not the latter – which had 
grown increasingly nervous and anxious to intervene in the electoral process 
as polling day approached22 – would have accepted the results in such a 
situation, it is safe to say that the absence of an absolute Maoist victory 
certainly helped to preserve peace. Here again, the consequences of a loss 
weren’t as dramatic as in other contexts and the motivation to trigger conflict 
was thus reduced. 
3.2.3  The electoral system allowed for a very inclusive result
Aside from the Maoists, observers of the pre-election day period also 
mentioned armed militant groups, in particular from the Tarai region, as 
potential sources of post-election violence and conflict (see for example ICG 
2008 April, 7). These groups – ethnic minorities and inhabitants of margin-
alized areas – fought for greater representation in government institutions. 
The elections resulted in a Constituent Assembly that was far more represent-
ative than previous parliaments and was termed the “most inclusive body 
Nepal has yet known” by then Special Representative of the Secretary 
General, Ian Martin (quoted in ICG 2008 July, 15). This inclusiveness, which 
was due to the specificities of the electoral system, contributed greatly (while 
certainly not sufficiently) to the widespread acceptance of the results and 
defused a major motivation to engage in conflict by addressing a structural 
cause thereof (see also Heiniger 2010, 53). 
 Nepal’s electoral system for the 2008 Constituent Assembly elections 
had seen dramatic changes from the one that was used for the last elections 
in 1999, which had been a fully majoritarian, solely FPTP system. In 2008, 240 
seats would be allocated through FPTP voting, 335 through proportional 
voting, and 26 seats would be appointed by the cabinet after the election. 
 The total number of seats had thus been raised to 601 in 2008 from 205 
in 1999. This implied not only that more FPTP seats were available but also, 
and in particular, that the large number of proportional seats meant that less 
than a third of a percent of the votes would suffice for a party to win a seat. 
Indeed, the smallest party to win a seat gathered only 23,512 votes – or 0.22%. 
Had the system been entirely majoritarian, with the originally intended 240 
seats, only 9 parties would have been represented in parliament and the 
Maoists would have received exactly 50% of the seats despite only winning 
slightly over 30% of the votes. With the addition of the proportional seats, the 
number of parties represented increased to 25 and the Maoists' share of total 
seats decreased to 38.1%. This diversity, which critics would term ‘fragmen-
tation’, is visible in Graph 1, which reflects the respective share of seats of the 
parties in the CA.23 
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24 “Of the 197 women in the CA, 30 were 
elected through the First-Past-Th e-Post 
(FPTP) system, 161 through the Propor-
tional Representation (PR) system and 6 
were nominated through the Council of 
Ministers. The PR system, within the mixed 
electoral system adopted by the Interim 
Constitution, calls for 50 per cent women 
candidates” (IDEA 2011, 51). 
25 Candidates could of course meet several 
criteria simultaneously (e.g. a Dalit wo-
man). 
26 For a detailed discussion of the quota 
system, the process through which it was 
developed, and the effects it had, see. Bu-
tenschøn and Vollan (2011, pp. 110-151). 
27 On the longer term impact on the peace 
process of the increased representation 
of women in Nepali politics since the 
2008 elections, see Falch (2010) and IDEA 
(2011).
 In addition to giving proportional voting greater weight, the electoral 
system also guaranteed the inclusion of various minorities through fixed 
quotas: Women would get at least a third of the seats (they won 197)24, 
Madhesi at least 76 (won 204), Dalits at least 32 (won 50), Janjatis at least 94 
(won 192), so-called backward regions at least 8, and other minorities, 
including religious minorities (Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists and Muslims) 
at least 47.25  It appears as if representation in the Constituent Assembly 
pleased most of the disadvantaged groups – in particular those with sufficient 
organization to engage in counterproductive activities – and thus defused a 
major threat of violence.26
Graph 1: Distribution of seats by party in the Nepali constituent assembly 
elected in 2008
 
 Women in particular were better represented than ever before in 
Nepal’s history, increasing their share of the seats from 6% in the 1999 
election to 17.3% in the post-CPA appointed interim parliament to 32.8% 
through the Constituent Assembly elections (Renaissance Society Nepal 2009, 
40). According to IDEA (2011, 75), women were “effective agents of inclusion” 
and their active engagement and success in the electoral process may have 
contributed to the viability of the outcome. Constituting half of the population, 
they represented a very large group that now had an enormous vested interest 
in protecting this outcome.27 
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3.2.4  The electoral system was negotiated until all potential spoilers 
agreed to it
The conflict preventing nature of the electoral system raises the question 
about its design process. The Interim Constitution of Nepal, promulgated in 
January 2007, only foresaw a Constituent Assembly composed of 425 
members (205 FPTP, 204 proportional, 16 nominated by the Interim Council of 
Ministers) but already tasked the parties with the responsibility to ensure 
“proportional” representation of the groups mentioned above. The electoral 
law, passed in June 2007, raised the number of seats to 497 (240/240/17). The 
final number of 601 seats (240/335/26) was the result of an agreement 
between the 7-party alliance and the Maoists in December 2007. The disputes 
around the electoral system involved the Maoists, who demanded a fully 
proportional system, and other parties (in particular the Nepali Congress), 
which favored a majoritarian system.28 In order to reach agreement, the 
elections were postponed for a second time in October 2007. While this move 
was seen as increasing the likelihood of violence by observers at the time, in 
retrospect broad ownership of, and agreement with the electoral system 
seems to have been more important. 
 In addition to the 7-Party Alliance satisfying the Maoist demand for a 
greater share of proportional seats, the interim Government of Nepal also 
secured an agreement with the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF) in 
February 2008, which, by (paradoxically) relaxing the electoral law, allowed for 
the inclusion of a larger number of Madhesi candidates on party lists.29 This 
agreement succeeded in bringing the UDMF into the fold and tremendously 
reduced the threat of post-election violence (UNMIN 2008a, 2008b, 2008c).
3.2.5  Armies and arms were cantoned and monitored by the UN
The 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement foresaw the presence of a UN 
peacekeeping mission, which the UN Security Council mandated with five 
major tasks.30 Three of these concerned the arms and armed personnel of both 
sides, while two concerned technical assistance to the electoral process. The 
cantonment of arms and armies on both sides, and the verification of these by 
UNMIN, provided a powerful deterrent to both sides to return to armed 
conflict. 
 According to Gross (2009, 13), “the symbolic presence of the UN is 
perceived to have deescalated the conflict, changed the acceptable rules of 
the political game, and exerted a psychological impact on the belligerents that 
deters violence.” The role of the UN as a trouble shooter and conflict preventer 
became apparent again in the days before the elections. Three days before the 
polls, the UN SRSG reportedly managed to convince the army to stay in the 
barracks despite the latter’s expressed “readiness to intervene”.31  
 28 It is an irony of history that the system 
that the Maoists demanded in effect re-
duced their share of seats in the CA. They 
had done much better than they themsel-
ves expected in the single-member FPTP 
constituencies. 
29 See http://reliefweb.int/node/258726 
Stringent quotas were only required of 
parties who fielded more candidates than 
20% of all seats. By raising this number 
to 30%, small locally active parties would 
be able to file 50% more candidates wit-
hout being subjected to any of the quota 
regulations. Madhesi parties were thus 
able to put more Madhesi candidates on 
their lists. 
30 In detail, these tasks are: a)  To monitor 
the management of arms and armed 
personnel of both sides, in line with the 
provisions of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement; (b)  To assist the parties 
through a Joint Monitoring Coordinating 
Committee in implementing their agree-
ment on the management of arms and 
armed personnel of both sides, as provi-
ded for in that agreement; (c)   To assist in 
the monitoring of the ceasefire arrange-
ments; (d)  To provide technical support 
for the planning, preparation and conduct 
of the election of a Constituent Assembly 
in a free and fair atmosphere, in consul-
tation with the parties; (e)  To provide a 
small team of electoral monitors to re-
view all technical aspects of the electoral 
process, and report on the conduct of the 
election; http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2007/sc8942.doc.htm
31 Article published by nepalnews.
com, available at http://reliefweb.int/
node/261855
Nepal - 2008 Constituent Assembly Elections
29
3.2.6  Nobody expected the results, but they were perceived as credible
The International Crisis Group’s assessment, quoted above, that there were 
“near universal expectations” (2008 April, 7) of a Maoist defeat, seems to be 
an accurate reflection of reality. In fact, the Maoists themselves were the only 
actor to believe in their own success. However, even they were at times in 
doubt and, as is visible in retrospect, similarly mistaken: their insistence on a 
greater share of proportional seats as a precondition for their participation in 
the elections turned out to have reduced their share of seats in the 
Constituent Assembly. 
 Despite the unanticipated nature of the results, actors did not challenge 
them. It could be argued that the losers were unable to react to this outcome 
because they did not expect it and were thus thoroughly unprepared, but as 
mentioned earlier, this was not the case: the armies were “intact, as strong as 
ever and ready to fight if necessary” (ICG 2008b, 21). However, the credibility 
of the election administration seems to have played a role. Very often, the 
level of criticism and blame with which an EMB is confronted can serve as an 
indicator of this credibility. It appears, in this particular case, that the parties 
were satisfied with the Elections Commission, and perceived at least polling 
day itself as credible. While most parties who fared more poorly than expected 
protested verbally, very few formal complaints were lodged. The EU Observer 
mission mentioned that complaints lodged by various actors (including 
political parties) led to re-polling in 106 polling stations out of a total of 20,889 
polling stations nationwide (i.e. about 0.5%), and that re-polling was success-
fully carried out 9 days later (EUEOM 2008, 38).
 International observation of the elections, in cooperation with local 
observation, appears to have had a positive effect on the credibility of the 
Elections Commission in general and polling day in particular. The EU Obser-
vation Mission, for example, in its preliminary statement issued on April 12, 
stated that “the Election Commission has acted as an independent body with 
integrity and competence,” that the elections had “generally been organized in 
a professional and transparent manner” and represented a “crucial step 
toward the restoration of representative democracy in Nepal,” and that 
“generally polling went smoothly” (EUEOM 2008, 4). The Carter Center’s report 
contained similar praise and, as Whitfield (2008, 30) noted, “made a significant 
contribution to the credibility with which the process was received.”
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3.2.7  Overwhelming support for democratic change
It should not be forgotten that one of the specificities of the Nepal process 
toward peace and democracy was started by mass protests involving millions 
of Nepali citizens. It is particularly noteworthy that women played a vital role 
in these protests (IDEA 2011, 45), constituting a powerful force in support of 
democratic change. 
 A few months ahead of the elections and despite the challenges of 
political negotiations and electoral campaigning, International IDEA wrote in a 
study on the state of democracy in Nepal that “the overwhelming consensus 
among the political parties and the people of Nepal is that the country should 
be transformed into a republic” (IDEA 2008, 2) and listed the fact that “the 
process of social capital formation, which has been exhibited in several ways, 
ensures the sustainability and consolidation of democracy in Nepal” (IDEA 
2008, 6) as the first of ten key findings. In such a situation of “overwhelming 
consensus,” potential spoilers find it much harder to operate. 
 In sum, while different factors contributed to the peaceful nature of the 
election, the case study shows the crucial role of inclusiveness of the process 
as well as its outcome. The electoral system, negotiated with potential 
spoilers until the very last moment, was eventually “owned” by all key stake-
holders and thus carried great legitimacy. It also included various quotas 
based on gender, ethnicity, religion, and caste and other rules that ensured 
the inclusion of previously marginalized groups. The representation of women 
in particular saw a tremendous increase from 6% in 1999 to almost 33% in 
2008. While the particular outcome in terms of distribution of votes eventually 
lies outside the influence of “electoral engineering,” the proportional aspects 
of the electoral system contributed at least in part to the result that no party 
won an absolute majority of the seats, which in turn reduced the impact of 
defeat for the losers. Rather than being determined by voters, the question of 
who would control the executive branch of government was going to require 
cooperation between parties. Similarly, no party could feel a priori excluded 
from the eminently important process of drafting the constitution and had at 
least some bargaining power within the system, an aspect that certainly 
reduced the motivation to use violence as a means to voice their preferences 
or express grievances. Such an inclusive process can be attributed on the one 
hand to the electoral system and on the other hand to the specific role and 
functioning of the constituent assembly, which requires a two-thirds majority 
for making decisions. The electoral system also guaranteed representation to 
various social groups. The overwhelming desire for (and support of) 
democratic change among the general population, exemplified by the mass 
protests against the King’s grasp of power in 2005, was a factor that any 
potential spoilers of the process had to take into consideration. 
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The case studies of the Sierra Leone 2007 and Nepal 2008 elections show that 
potential explanations for peaceful conduct are numerous and most likely it is 
the configuration of many factors that led to this particular outcome. At times 
very different factors emerged from the study of the two cases, which empha-
sizes the importance of context, and highlights that measures taken for 
preventing election-related violence are not universal but need to be tailored 
to the specificity of each case. Despite the differences, some of the factors 
identified were similar in both cases. In particular, we would like to point to 
three important factors that were present both in Nepal and in Sierra Leone. 
Credible elections 
The credibility of the election was important for reducing the opportunity for 
political actors to reject the results. Given that the elections were generally 
perceived as fair, political actors were less likely revert to actions – notably 
violent – outside of the institutions to achieve their goals. Credibility was 
achieved through different means including the respect of procedure and the 
perceived impartiality of the election management bodies, training of polling 
staff and of the population, the presence of numerous local and international 
observers, the good work of the security sector which in both cases can be at 
least partially attributed to a reform preceding the election. Both in Sierra 
Leone and in Nepal the relatively high turnout also gave the elections greater 
legitimacy. 
Inclusive political processes
Both in Sierra Leone and in Nepal, the important decisions regarding the 
election followed an inclusive process which, we argue, played a positive role 
in diffusing conflict. This was the case in Sierra Leone, where the nomination 
of the chair of the electoral commission was key in establishing trust and thus 
the credibility of the institution. This important decision was taken following 
consultations with opposition parties. In Nepal, one of the potentially 
conflicting choices was in regard to the electoral system that would be used in 
the constituency assembly elections. The process of establishing this 
electoral system was slow but included all major parties and led to a 
compromise agreed on by all stakeholders. Furthermore, it is worth 
mentioning that this inclusiveness was achieved notably through institutional 
arrangements developed at various stages of the electoral cycle and seems to 
have allowed the prevention of some of the risks associated with the 
elections. 
International involvement 
The international community was very present in these two elections. This 
international support can be broadly assigned to two complementary mecha-
nisms. On the one hand, the international community provided financial, 
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logistical and organisational support, notably by training polling staff and 
security forces and, on the other, it also played an important role by promoting 
fair elections and pressuring certain important actors to comply with the 
rules.
 In addition to these factors applicable to both situations, those that are 
specific to each case should not be discounted. Sierra Leone’s fully majori-
tarian electoral system, un-questioned by the political actors in that country 
and seemingly unproblematic, would in all likelihood have had a negative 
impact in Nepal, where the proportional component and the quotas, subject to 
intense negotiations, played a major role in ensuring the inclusiveness of the 
election’s results and therefore their acceptance. Similarly, while the Security 
Sector Reform process was entirely stalled in Nepal, it can be argued that the 
fundamental restructuring and reform of both the army and the police in 
Sierra Leone played a crucial – and necessary – role in Sierra Leone. 
 All the factors presented above potentially explain why the 2007 
elections in Sierra Leone and the 2008 Nepal elections did not result in 
widespread violence despite fears to the contrary. These important achieve-
ments shouldn’t, however, overshadow some of the negative aspects of the 
elections. Indeed, the lack of a widespread conflict does not necessarily mean 
that the elections were a success either for democratization or for the long 
term peace process. In particular, in the case of Sierra Leone, the patronage 
links that characterize Sierra Leone politics remained; the elections resulted 
in a greater ethnic and geographical polarization and did not improve the 
accountability of elected politicians (see Kurz 2010). Similarly, there has not 
been progress in closing the participation and representation gender gap that 
characterizes Sierra Leone politics (see Castillejo 2009).  As for the case of 
Nepal, the very inclusive electoral system and diverse composition  
of the constituent assembly may have negatively influenced the decision-
making process as the qualified majority of two thirds for the approval of the 
new constitution has been very difficult to achieve. Along the same lines, the 
competitiveness of the electoral process may have put an end to the cooper-
ative and consensus-oriented spirit of politics that prevailed until then 
(Heiniger 2010, 53). This raises questions with regard to governability in the 
long run, a factor that critics say is proved by the rapid succession of govern-
ments and the fact that today, more than four years after the elections, the 
constitution still hasn’t been promulgated.
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 One of the challenges of this research is related to the lack of a clear 
conceptual framework regarding the risks associated with elections. The 
literature so far has mainly focused on case studies that were practically 
oriented and there have been only a few attempts to theorize the risks related 
to electoral processes, i.e. answering the question of what the causes and 
triggers of the emergence of violent conflict linked to elections are. This is 
precisely where the most fruitful avenues for future research are to be found. 
The development of a sound conceptual framework for the study of election-
related violence would certainly be helpful for future research in this area. In 
that respect, while not directly contributing to this goal, our study provides 
some interesting insights that could be useful in the perspective of theory 
building. This would enable the development of a more theoretically-driven 
approach that would be very welcome for the study of additional cases, which 
represent the other major avenue for research. Ideally, future studies would 
include more cases, incorporating also elections that did not result in a 
peaceful shift in power in order to gain more insight into the factors that play  
a role in the preventing election-related violence.  
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